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NARRATING THE FICTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE
SUPREME COURT
Table of Contents
Introduction
Part I

ENGLISH STORIES

English Sovereignty
English Sovereignty Retold
Part II

SUPREME COURT STORIES

Popular Sovereignty
Nationalism
Federalism and Nationalism
Part III
Conclusion.

CONSTITUTIONAL STORIES

INTRODUCTION
Sovereign immunity is a fiction. But it is a fiction that jurists uncomfortably
accept as true. In the words of Justice Stevens, it is “the vainest of all legal fictions.”1
Perhaps, though the moral qualities of the doctrine does not prevent its continued
application. For Justice Stevens continues “its persistence cannot be denied, but ought
not be celebrated.”2 Or consider the description by the Supreme Court in Nevada v. Hall:
“We must of course reject the fiction [sovereign immunity]. It was rejected by the
colonists when they declared their independence from the Crown… But the notion that
immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our cases.”3 Or again,
Justice Stevens suggesting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to flourish
despite the perishing of its “raison d’être.”4
To understand sovereign immunity and its fictional origins, one must understand
the narratives that surround the fiction.5 Fictions are intangible and depend on normative

1

United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S.596, 622 (1989) (Stevens, J. Dissenting).
Id.
3
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1978).
4
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 87 (1988).
5
Another way of saying this is as Jeff Powell said in The Moral Tradition of American
Constitutionalism - that American Constitutionalism requires a normative framework
that includes both historical and normative descriptions called traditions. See POWELL,
THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 44 (1993). Powell builds his
argument on the normative tradition as defined by Alasdair Macintyre, who defines
tradition as “an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental
agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics
and enemies external to the tradition…., and those internal, interpretive debates through
which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed
and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.” See id. at 13-14 citing ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHICH REALITY (1988). Notably, this article suggests that
the primary tradition or narrative that American Constitutionalism has adopted for
sovereign immunity is one external to the system, leading to little internal and
interpretive debate regarding its meaning.
2

presuppositions.6 You cannot test a legal fiction by feeling its body or by logical
deduction. It’s a non-truth. But it’s a non-truth that we accept as real, as if it were
concrete and tangible. For that reason, legal fictions depend on something outside of its
own words to support its meaning. That something is always normative. It can be in the
form of stories histories or as proverbial wisdom but it always carries normative weight.
The narratives that are told in support of fictions become embedded in the legal
subconscious and in some ways become sacramental in fulfillment of the fiction.
Fictions could possibly manifest an existence outside of law, but never outside of its
story.
The sovereign immunity fiction raises uncomfortable conclusions. First, and
contrary to Justice Steven’s assertion, it is not an acknowledgement that everything the
government does is always right, but rather, that claims against the government have no
forum for resolution. So the majority in United States v. Dalm did not need to consider
the equitable claims of the matter. Rather the majority’s analysis is rather terse: (1)
“under settled principles of sovereign immunity, the United States as Sovereign is
immune from suits, save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued
in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit;”7 (2) a statute of
limitations requiring that a suit against the government be brought within a certain time

6

See Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4, (1983)
(“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists outside of the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning. For every constitution, there is an epic, for each Decalogue, there is
a scripture.”).
7
Dalm, 494 U.S. at 608 citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).

period is one of those terms;8 (3) the court does not have the power to expand Congress’s
determination of jurisdictional limits;9 and (4) because Ms. Dalm failed to bring her
action within the prescribed time period, the United States wins.10 Justice Stevens
chastises this analysis as merely a jurisdictional apology in the face of equitable facts.11
However, the uncomfortable lesson from the majority may simply be that the sovereign
sets the boundaries for its own liability.
The second uncomfortability is both textual and normative; more precise, it is
non-textual and normative. That is, no where in the Constitution’s seven articles and
twenty-seven amendments are the words “sovereign immunity” construed or construable
to create a federal immunity. Indeed, if one takes the absence of the textual right in the
original constitution, together with the Court’s denial of state sovereign immunity in
Chisolm v. Georgia, one might rightly conclude that sovereign immunity did not cross

8

Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612 citing United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); Block
v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983).
9
Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612 citing United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-118 (1979); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
310, 318 (1986); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (“waivers of sovereign
immunity by congress “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”).
10
Dalm, 494 U.S. at 609-610. Ms. Dalm brought an action for recoupment of overpaid
taxes under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), which provides jurisdiction in the district courts for
the recovery of any “internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected. The Court, in its holding required 28 U.S.C. § 1346 to be read in
para materia with sections 7422(a) and 6511(a). Section 7422(a) requires that before a
suit may be instituted for a refund that a claim be presented to the secretary of the
treasury. Section 6511(a) required that claims for refund of overpayment of taxes be
brought within three years of the date the tax return was filed. The Court found that Ms
Dalm complied with neither.
11
Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612. Justice Stevens also decries sovereign immunity as “majestic
voices” with a “haunting charm.” Id. at 616. Continuing on, Justice Stevens heroically
defends Bull v. United States, saying the court then, “reasoned not in obedience to these
siren-like voices but rather under the reliable guidance of a bright star in our
jurisprudence: the presumption that for every right there should be a remedy. Id. citing
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803).

the Atlantic with the original colonists.12 This position may be defendable as to state
sovereign immunity, but towards the Federal Government, Chisolm does not venture so
far: “I hold it, therefore to be no degradation of sovereignty, in the states, to submit to the
Supreme Judiciary of the United States. At the same time, by way of anticipating an
objection, I assert that it will not follow, from these premises, that the United States
themselves may be sued.”13
Chisolm v. Georgia involved a citizen from the state of South Carolina who sued
the state of Georgia in Federal District Court under Article III, section 2 of the
Constitution. Article III, section 2 reads: “The judicial power of the United States shall
extend to all cases, in Law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and treaties made under their authority… between a State and citizens of
another state.”14 As we noted above, the Court decided that sovereign immunity did not
bar the suit between the citizen of South Carolina and the state of Georgia since the
Constitution specifically authorized such a suit.15 But shortly after Chisolm v. Georgia
was decided, two and three days to be exact, amendments were proposed on the floor of
the House of Representatives to correct Chisolm’s erroneous holding and secure
sovereign immunity towards the states. One of those amendments was the Eleventh
Amendment ultimately ratified and which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
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See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 415.
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 425 (1792).
14
U.S. Const. Art. III § 2.
15
Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 425.
13

by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any
foreign state.16
Textually the eleventh amendment would appear to put to rest any questions of either
State or Federal Sovereign Immunity. State Immunity was directly addressed by the
terms of the amendment. But by implication, the Federal government too shielded itself
from suits; put another way, if the states are protected under the Constitution, how much
more is the supreme sovereign protected by its own charter. 17
Chisolm offers further insight as to Sovereign Immunity’s origins – that of the
peace of the realm as derived by common law. The court theorizes the possibilities if
states were not able to sue one another. If a the State of Georgia injures a citizen of the
state of South Carolina, South Carolina must remonstrance on behalf of its own citizen.
If South Carolina has no means of doing so, the allegiance the citizen had to South
Carolina will naturally become suspect. So the natural next step is war between South
Carolina and Georgia. Because a primary principle of the federal government is
maintaining peace amongst the several states, it is better to allow a citizen of one state
sue another state than to force a state of war between the two states.18 But under the
same logic, the federal authority may not be sued, precisely for the same reason that there
is no threat of war towards the United States were it to injure its citizen.

16

U.S. Const. Amend. XI.
Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 426 (“The judicial act recognizes the jurisdiction over states.
Instead of using the first expression in the Constitution, to wit “cases and controversies
between , etc..” it adopts the second, namely “where a state shall be a party.” Thus, it
makes no distinction between a state as a plaintiff or as defendant.”) Thus according to
the Judiciary act of 1789 and Article III, the text suggested that Sovereign Immunity as to
the States was not a valid defense.
18
Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at ___. Chief Justice John Jay also reaffirmed that sovereign
immunity would still bar suits against the United States, when it did not against the
several states. See Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 478 (Jay, C.J.).
17

And Justice ___ may have a valid argument. Consider the one time that our states
did enter into combat against one another. Arguably, its purpose was to vindicate the
rights of one state’s citizens (the southern states) against the governments of the northern
states, who tried to politically deprive Southern slave holders the right to certain property.
Whether we agree with the moral implications of the Southern States’ arguments (which I
do not) one could argue that were Sovereign immunity a non-possibility, the entire civil
war could have been no more than one large litigation, perhaps still mired in discovery or
some other procedural aspect, and rendering the house divided into more of a Bleak
House pitting one Jarndyce against another.19
Certainly our Republican origins, the Constitution itself, and the opinion in
Chisolm v. Georgia begs the question whether sovereign immunity made the transAtlantic journey. And the answer we get is as unsatisfactory as fictions almost always
are. As we have already said, Chisolm v. Georgia was not the beginning of the end for
sovereign immunity. Instead, Congress reaffirmed principles of sovereign immunity
towards the states in the Eleventh Amendment, which barred suits from citizens of
foreign states against a sovereign state. And since that time, war has not broken out
between two states to protect one citizen’s rights against that state.20
In addition to the 1793 Congress that urged the eleventh Amendment directly in
relation to the Chisolm holding, other early founders certainly believed Sovereign
Immunity was inherent in the Constitution. The Federalist Papers contain some of the
most powerful and politically charged statements relating to Sovereign Immunity and
19

20

See Bicknel, (Constitution produced litigation instead of revolution).

We of course assume the Civil War to have much more contextual circumstances than
the southern states protecting themselves against the Northern States. Rather, properly
interpreted, the Civil War’s sovereignty problems relate more directly to the Southern
States protecting their sovereignty against the Federal government.

form great evidence of its retention in the Constitution. Among those statements include
Alexander Hamilton’s concise description of Sovereign Immunity as a form of the social
contract:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.
This is the general sense and the general practice of
mankind … The contracts between a nation and individuals
are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and
have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no
right of action independent of the sovereign will. 21
Hamilton introduces normative concepts into the question of Sovereign Immunity,
namely that sovereigns have as a natural part of existence immunity from suit by its own
citizens.
***
To this point we have described the tensions that federal sovereign immunity
begets: namely that sovereign immunity leads to uncomfortable results when the
sovereign acts inappropriately; that sovereign immunity at the federal level is not
described in any complete detail in the Constitution unlike state immunity (but that by
implication, and the Supremacy Clause, there may be inferred immunity); and that
sovereign immunity may be read as a necessary term within the social contract of a
Federal system both to preserve peace as suggested by Chisolm v. Geogia and as a natural
result of being sovereign. Now, a fuller description of federal sovereign immunity will
illuminate these tensions.

21

THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton).

Sovereign immunity is based on the supposition that the sovereign cannot be sued
without its consent.22 The first case that recognized that sovereign immunity was a bar to
suits was Cohens v. Virginia.23 Cohens is an important statement for federal sovereign
immunity because it involved a citizen of the state of Virginia suing the state of Virginia;
this in contrast to Chisolm v. Georgia which involved a citizen of South Carolina suing
the state of Georgia.24 In supporting its argument that the federal court maintained no
jurisdiction to hear a suit brought against the state of Virginia, the court looked to the
sovereign status of the states prior to the Federal compact. The Court said:
It is an axiom in politics that a sovereign and independent
state is not liable to the suit of any individual, nor amenable
to any judicial power, without its own consent. All the
States of this union were sovereign and independent before
they became parties to the federal compact: hence I infer
that the judicial power of the United States would not have
extended to them, eo nominee upon the face of the
Constitution.25
And as we discussed above, the Cohens court came to the same conclusion as Chisolm v.
Georgia, inferring that the Constitution had in fact extended that judicial power in the
Constitution, Article III, section 2. But, the matter before the Cohens court was
different. Involving a citizen of the sovereign sued, the Court found no authority in the
Federal Compact for entertaining judicial power over the state of Virginia. “The case of
a contest between a state and one of its own citizens, is not included in [the enumeration
of Article III, section 2]; and consequently, if the principle I have advanced is a sound
22

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882).
CITE. As noted above, the Justices in Chisolm v. Georgia, recognized that while
sovereign immunity would not apply to the states, they were more uncomfortable with
the same conclusion as applied to the Federal government. See CITES.
24
See e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6 U.S. (Wheaton) 264, 302 (1821); and Chisolm, 2 U.S.
(Dall.) at ___. See also _____.
25
Chohens, 6 U.S. (Wheaton) at 303.
23

one, the judicial power of the United States does not extend to it.”26 Thus in 1821, the
principle firmly established was that citizens may not sue their own sovereign except
where the sovereign consents.
This position begged the theoretical and difficult question in the United States –
who is sovereign that can consent to suit. The Court in U.S. v. Lee offered a theoretical
solution.
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects
are the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or
individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of
loyalty to the person of a monarch. The citizen here knows
no person, however near to those in power, or however
powerful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which
the law secures to him when it is well administered.27
Simply put the people are sovereign in the American republic, owing no allegiance to any
executive that exists above the law; the question of infallibility is discussed in greater
detail in Part A.

Thus, the logical doctrine that developed and which holds true today is

that the United States may not be sued unless Congress, representative of the people
(sovereign) consents.28
***
The questions that the above description asks are situated on two different levels –
a macro and a micro. On the Micro level, it asks “have we gotten Sovereign Immunity
right?” That is, does Justice Stevens have a point when he notes that the institution is out
of sync with the narrative we tell ourselves about our Constitution. Or is this a case of
the trivially true, an inconsistency we have learned to live with.
26

Id. at 303.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882).
28
CITE
27

On the macro level, it asks a central question of constitutional theory. That is,
how do we approach problems that appear to have historical antecedents with
inconsistent results. The same analysis could be done with regard to how the
Constitution can be about freedom, yet still endorse slavery. This topic, though less sexy,
is arguably more relevant.29
The thesis that all of the foregoing, and the balance of this project supports is two
fold. Generally, the thesis holds that the notion to sovereign immunity should be tied to
the ways we define our sovereign. The way a sovereign is defined may be done in two
ways: we can either normalize what we want the sovereign to look like, and then work
out the way that the sovereign legally interacts with his surroundings; or we can define
the legal boundaries of what the sovereign is bound by, and then normalize him around
the boundaries. Said more abruptly, we can either fictionalize our sovereign by telling
stories about him, and then develop the law of the sovereign around those stories, or we
can bind the sovereign to reality by tying him solely to the law. I suggest that in the
United States, our tendency has been to assimilate to the former, though the nature of our
Constitution begs the later. Thus, our judges have told stories of sovereigns and the
fictions that originate in the English Common Law (which I argue appears to have a fully
integrated fiction) instead of basing the doctrine on law.
Part One shows us what a fully fictionalized sovereign looks like. It uses as an
example the concept of the King’s Two Bodies to show how stories of Sovereigns take
shape. This concept of the uncomfortable fiction to describe how Sovereign Immunity’s
fictions are grounded by form and do indeed flourish and take on new life – even when

29

Though new considerations of how the Thirteenth Amendment and the notion of people as property is a
modern concern by Jedediah Purdy. I, then, shall leave that application to him.

its raison d’être has long past, is most apparent when viewed under the lens of
antiquarian notions of government and order. Accordingly, Part A is mostly historical.
The King’s Two Bodies held that the King of England was contained in a dual body –
one natural and one mystical. The Natural body was subject to decay and to death while
the mystical body never died, never aged, never was impaired. Accordingly, the kingly
body never suffered at law, because the King was the law and ever maintained the law.
From the King’s Two Bodies, we show how the normative fiction becomes embedded in
the narrative of English theory. Drawing on Fortescue, Locke, and Blackstone, we show
three different narratives, all dealing with the same themes, but all trying to make sense
of the twin-bodied king. Part I ends by surveying American conflation of Blackstone and
Lockean theory in its understanding of sovereignty.
Part two turns to the American Context. Having already in this introduction set
forth the way things are regarding sovereign immunity, Part II outlines three approaches
that have been taken when approaching the problem of sovereign immunity. The first is
the John Jay / James Wilson approach to throw out both the narrative and the institution
of Sovereign Immunity under a strict construction of the American narrative. The
second, is an approach by Justice Story and Justice Holmes which co-opts the features of
the sovereign described and places them within a specific American body; the result is a
highly nationalistic sovereign, with nationalistic aims. The third considers the Reihnquist
Court’s treatment of sovereignty as taking the aims of the British story (without the
narrative features itself) and using them to sustain a federalist view point some of the
time and a Nationalistic view at other times.

For the reasons described in part three none of these approaches are particularly
satisfying. Part three then offers this author’s solution – a fourth way of viewing
sovereign immunity that incorporates the original conceptions of sovereign immunity
with a narrative about the constitution – an aspect of each of the prior narratives that is
omitted. It begins by placing the sovereignty/ sovereign immunity discussion within a
narrative that explains both its nationalism and federalism dimensions. It continues by
suggesting that rhythmic patterns envelope the debate and create reactionary decisions by
courts and legislatures. The better way, as this author suggests, is finding a narrative that
makes sense Constitutionally, for a doctrine that is not found in the document.
This project is intended to be different from other works relating to sovereign
immunity as it tends to support the dispensability of the fiction for the purpose of
governmental power. In this regard, it contrasts the position adopted by the distinguished
Professor Jaffe who suggested that sovereign immunity was unnecessary as a theoretical
inquiry when pursuing claims against government officials.30 Jaffe’s analysis begins by a
thorough consideration of writs against the Crown from Bracton forward. Jaffe’s
conclusion, that “Sovereign immunity, whatever it is or is not, has never had, and does
not have today much impact on the judicial control of administrative illegality,” is more
realist than this work is intended to be.31 Indeed, Jaffe somewhat acknowledges what one
conclusion that this project draws: that fictions animate themselves and create new
fictions. He says in the very beginning “by a magnificent irony, this body of doctrine and
practice, at least in form so favorable to the subject, lost one-half of its efficacy when

30

See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
31
Id.

translated into our state and federal systems.”32 He means to tell us that the doctrine as
alive in England did not relocate the writs of action against governmental officials to the
new world. And accordingly, the fiction continued to beget new forms of the fiction and
derived new life.

32

Id. at 2.

